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COMMENT
The Case for Comparative Proportionality Review
The United States Constitution supports the rational, even-
handed, and consistent imposition of capital punishment by the
states.' The Constitution, however, does not support capital sentenc-
ing statutes which permit judges and juries unfettered discretion to
determine which defendants will receive the death penalty.2 Any dis-
cretion must be exercised in accordance with readily identifiable and
rationally reviewable objective criteria.3 As the Supreme Court has
noted, arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking is unacceptable
when applied to "a matter [as] grave as the determination of whether
a human life should be taken or spared."
'4
Present state capital punishment statutes represent state legisla-
tures' best attempts to promote rational, evenhanded, and consistent
sentencing results.5 Nearly all these statutes provide for automatic
appeal of death sentences. In addition to appellate review of the
trial, most states also require comparative proportionality review in
order to determine whether, considering both the crime and the de-
fendant, the sentence is proportionate to that imposed in similar
cases within the state.
6
1 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
247 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976).
2 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
3 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
4 Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741 (1983) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
5 Presently, 38 states have some form of statutorily mandated capital punishment.
Twelve others (Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) do not impose capital punishment
under any circumstances.
6 Of the 38 states with capital punishment statutes, 30 require some form of compara-
tive proportionality review before authorities carry out a death sentence. Twenty-seven states
require comparative proportionality review by statute. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b(b) (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11,
§ 4209(g)(2)(a) (1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1982); IDAHO CODE 19-2827(c)
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO.
ANN., art. 905.9 (West Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(4) (Supp. 1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.014.3(3) (Vernon 1979);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(3) (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(d) (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.5 (VII)(c) (Supp. 1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4C(4) (Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Page 1982);
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Although "proportionality" traditionally concerns whether a
particular sentence is appropriate punishment for a particular
crime,7 a comparative proportionality review presumes that the
death sentence is not per se excessive or inappropriate punishment
for the crime the defendant committed. The reviewing court instead
focuses on whether the death penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in
a particular case because other courts in the state have awarded
lesser sentences to similarly situated defendants convicted of factually
similar crimes." State appellate courts conduct this review to ensure
that their death penalty statutes will serve the "goals of fairness to
the accused and measured, consistent application."9
Although the Constitution mandates "meaningful appellate re-
view" of death sentences, 10 the Supreme Court recently ruled that it
does not require comparative proportionality review as an element of
state capital sentencing statutes. 1 The Court has stated, however,
that comparative proportionality review provides "maximum ration-
ality and consistency" in sentencing. 12 More than three-quarters of
the states which allow capital punishment already require some form
of comparative proportionality review. 13 The legislatures and courts
of these states have found that statewide comparative proportionality
review achieves just results in capital sentencing with no undue bur-
den on the reviewing body.'
4
This comment is directed toward the legislatures, judiciaries,
OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 701.12(C)(3) (West Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 42,
§ 971 1(h)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-12(3) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205(c) (1982); VA. CODE
§ 17-110, 1(C)(2) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2) (Supp. 1983); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103(d) (1983). In three others (Arizona, Arkansas, and Florida), judicial
decisions mandate comparative proportionality review. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 114
Ariz. 186, 196,560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 221-22, 548 S.W.2d 106,
120-21 (1977); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
7 The Supreme Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently dispro-
portionate to the crime committed. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty disproportionate punishment for rape).
8 Georgia's capital sentencing statute, for example, requires the reviewing court to de-
termine whether a death sentence "is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2537(c) (3) (1982). The Supreme Court has termed this type of appellate review "proportion-
ality review," see, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203; Prfiot, 428 U.S. at 259, or "comparative propor-
tionality review," see, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 872 (1984).
9 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 435 U.S. 104, 111 (1982).
10 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198; see also Puley, 104 S. Ct. at 883 (Stevens, J., concurring).
11 Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
12 Prqfiit, 428 U.S. at 258-59.
13 See note 6 supra.
14 Pule, 104 S. Ct. at 890 (Brennen, J., dissenting).
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and executives of the eight states which, while authorizing capital
punishment, do not conduct statewide proportionality review of
death sentences.15 Section I points to sound principles of public pol-
icy which counsel these states' legislatures to legislate statewide com-
parative proportionality review. Section II points to federal and
state constitutional principles which have led other state judiciaries
to adopt comparative proportionality review. Finally, section III en-
courages these states' governors, as a last resort, to conduct compara-
tive proportionality reviews while exercising their clemency power.
I. Public Policy Support for Statewide Comparative
Proportionality Review Legislation
The imposition of the death penalty is the most thorough and
permanent manifestation of a state's power over an individual. Ac-
cordingly, state legislatures have tried to write capital punishment
statutes which eliminate the potential for arbitrary and discrimina-
tory sentencing so that death sentences will be imposed in an even-
handed and consistent manner. Despite their efforts, evidence shows
that the death penalty is sometimes still arbitrarily and discriminato-
rily imposed. 16 Statewide comparative proportionality review has
eliminated at least a part of this inconsistency. 17 As executions occur
with greater frequency,' 8 the need to eliminate arbitrary and dis-
criminatory sentencing results has become more critical. For those
states with capital punishment statutes and no statewide compara-
tive proportionality review, the need for legislation in this area is par-
ticularly acute.
A. Discriminatoy Results in Capital Sentenc'ng
A rapidly growing number of legal scholars have examined the
15 California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Texas, Utah, and Vermont do not
conduct comparative proportionality review of death sentences. New York authorizes the
death penalty only for murder by life-term inmates while Vermont authorizes the death pen-
alty only for the first degree murder of correctional personnel. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13
§ 2303(C) (Supp. 1982). In these two states, comparative proportionality review would serve
a more limited purpose. Louisiana's capital punishment statute requires comparative propor-
tionality review, LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 905.9 (West Supp. 1982); however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court restricts its comparisons to cases within the same geographic subdi-
vision as the case under review. See Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1982).
This comment promotes statewide comparative proportionality review and therefore finds the
Louisiana procedure inadequate.
16 See notes 19-28 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 34-35 infra and accompanying text.
18 Pull, 104 S. Ct. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[1984]
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extent to which current state capital punishment statutes promote
discriminatory and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. They
have most commonly criticized the statutes for allowing racial factors
to substantially affect whether or not the death penalty is imposed.19
The commentators have also identified prosecutorial discretion, 20 the
defendant's gender and socioeconomic status,21 and the geographic
location within the state where the defendant stands trial22 as factors
which may promote inconsistent or discriminatory results in capital
sentencing.
Although research revealing that racial discrimination pervades
capital sentencing has not been completely and systematically mar-
shalled, 23 critics have frequently stated that the criminal justice sys-
tem has been and remains racially discriminatory. 24 For example,
two commentators have concluded that the South Carolina capital
sentencing statute discriminates against defendants whose victims are
white.2 5 Another commentator argues that the Florida death penalty
statute results in discrimination based on both the victim's race and
the defendant's race.26 In perhaps the least damning of all studies on
the subject, one commentator has provided a comprehensive reevalu-
ation of data published nationwide regarding how race influenced
executions from 1967 to 1978.27 He concluded that only courts in
southern states have generally imposed the death penalty for murder
in a manner which discriminates against blacks.
28
19 See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post- Furman Capital Stat-
ites, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980) (discrimination by defendant's race and victim's race);
Foley & Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges, andJuries in Capital Cases, 7 CRIM. JUST. J.
16 (Fall 1982) (discrimination by victim's race); Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and
Juy Packing.- Further Challenges to the Death Penalty, 73 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982)
(discrimination by victim's race); Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical
Evaluation of the Evidence With Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783
(1981); Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV.
918 (1981) (discrimination by victim's race); Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death
Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Ofenders Sentenced Pre- Furman and Post- Furman, 49
TEMP. L.Q. 261 (1976); Ziesel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida
Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981) (discrimination by defendant's race and victim's
race); see also C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIS-
TAKE (2d ed. 1981).
20 See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 46-53.
21 See, e.g., Foley & Powell, supra note 19.
22 See, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 19.
23 Pallq, 104 S. Ct. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24 See note 19 supra.
25 See Jacoby & Paternoster, supra note 19, at 384-87.
26 See Zeisel, supra note 19, at 456.
27 See Kleck, supra note 19.
28 Id.
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Because of the danger that race and other constitutionally im-
permissible factors will promote comparative excesses in sentencing,
all state capital sentencing statutes contain procedural safeguards in-
tended to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious results.
29
How well these procedural safeguards function, however, may vary
from case to case. A defendant can challenge the results either prior
to sentencing or on appeal, but will often lack the time, money, and
resources necessary to identify any discrimination. 30 The most timely
and logical way to identify any sentencing disparities is for a court of
statewide jurisdiction to compare sentences imposed for like crimes
by different judges and juries within the state.
B. The Value of Comparative Proportionality Review
Comparative proportionality review, while not constitutionally
mandated, is a valuable component of a capital sentencing proce-
dure. The United States Supreme Court has stated that some mean-
ingful appellate review of capital sentencing is necessary. 3' The
Court has further stated that comparative proportionality review
provides the "function of death sentence review with a maximum of
rationality and consistency. '32 Proportionality review is also an ef-
fective means to keep state courts apprised of changing sentencing
trends within the state. As the Supreme Court noted:
[P]roportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant
jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the
death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, these. . . proce-
dures assure that no defendant convicted under such circum-
stances will suffer a sentence of death. 33
Perhaps the best testament to the value of statewide compara-
tive proportionality review is found by examining the results ob-
tained in those states which already require such review. Thirty
states presently require statewide comparative proportionality review
before a death sentence can be carried out.34 Appellate courts in
29 For example, all statutes limit capital punishment to a specifically defined subclass of
homicide cases and identify aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the jury must
consider. Moreover, capital sentencing statutes typically require bifurcated trials and appel-
late review of death sentences.
30 See generally C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 94-101.
31 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198; see also Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 883 (Stevens, J., concurring).
32 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258-59.
33 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
34 See note 6supra. Additionally, the National Center for State Courts is presently devel-
oping a model proportionality review procedure for the various states. The Center's major
[19841
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these states have demonstrated that this procedure is capable of
preventing excessive sentences in particular cases.35 These states
have thus recognized that comparative proportionality review elimi-
nates some of the inconsistency that invariably plagues capital sen-
tencing. Since the goal of any capital sentencing statute must be to
impose sentences as evenhandedly as possible,3 6 public policy dictates
that each state's death penalty statute should provide statewide com-
parative proportionality review. This need for proportionality re-
view will continue to become more acute if death rows continue to
grow and executions increase throughout the states.
II. Judicial Adoption of Comparative Proportionality Review
The constitutions of the eight states which do not currently con-
duct statewide comparative proportionality review do not explicitly
require such review. Arguably, however, the due process and equal
protection clauses in their state constitutions imply that the state
should make every possible effort to ensure the evenhanded imposi-
tion of the death penalty. While the Supreme Court has stated that
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection and due process guar-
antees do not require statewide comparative proportionality re-
view, 37 neither the federal nor state constitutions prohibit or restrict
comparative proportionality review.
The Arizona, Arkansas, and Florida supreme courts require
comparative proportionality review even though their state capital
punishment statutes do not.38 These courts have stated that such re-
view is necessary to ensure evenhanded capital sentencing. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court noted as it reviewed a death sentence imposed
on a convicted murderer:
objectives are to develop methods to select factually similar cases for comparative purposes
and to assist state supreme courts which face important procedural questions arising in this
context.
35 In the following cases, state appellate courts have found that the death penalty was
excessive when compared to penalties imposed on similarly situated defendants within the
state: Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 488-489, 647 S.W.2d 419, 425 (1983); Sumlin v. State,
273 Ark. 185, 190, 617 S.W.2d 372, 375 (1981); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103, 1108-09 (Fla.
1981); McCaskill v. State, 344 So. 2d 783, 786-787 (Fla. 1977); Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d
1276, 1278-80 (Fla. 1976); Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974), a 'dsub nom.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612 (1974);
Coleman v. State, 378 So. 2d 640, 649-50 (Miss. 1979); State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333, 341-
42 (Mo. 1982); Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482, 487-88 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
36 See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
37 Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 781 (1984).
38 See note 6 supra.
COMMENT
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
[T]here is no specific requirement that this court compare
sentences in other cases; however, the scope of permissible review
of the sentence on appeal would necessarily require that we con-
sult prior cases as precedent for our determining whether there
was error in the sentencing procedure . . . [or] whether any of
the findings was the result of passion or prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor. .... 39
The judiciaries of the eight states which do not conduct comparative
proportionality review should follow the example of the Arkansas
Supreme Court and find that their capital sentencing statutes implic-
itly endorse such review.4°
Additionally, the wisdom of conducting comparative propor-
tionality review, regardless of the fact that it is not constitutionally
mandated, should prompt the remaining states to adopt such review.
As Justice Frankfurter noted: "[C]ivil liberties draw at best only lim-
ited strength from legal guaranties. Preoccupation with the constitu-
tionality, instead of with wisdom, of legislation or executive action is
preoccupation with a false value. '4 1 Not only the Supreme Court,
but the majority of the state legislatures have found "wisdom" in the
use of comparative proportionality review of death sentences. 42 In
order to ensure evenhanded results in capital sentencing in the re-
maining states, state judiciaries should do likewise.
III. Proportionality Review and Clemency
For those states with capital punishment statutes and no statuto-
rily or judicially mandated statewide comparative proportionality re-
view, the clemency procedure provides the final opportunity to
conduct such a review. Clemency, defined as an act of leniency or a
39 Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 221-22, 548 S.W.2d 106, 120-21 (1977).
40 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-203(7) (Supp. 1983):
(a) Whenever a sentence of death is imposed upon a person pursuant to the provi-
sions of this section, the Supreme Court shall review the propriety of that sentence,
having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the record of the of-
fender, the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed,
including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based.
(b) A sentence of death shall not be imposed pursuant to this section if the Supreme
Court determines that the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion or
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor or that the evidence does not support the
finding of statutory aggravating circumstances.
The scope of permissible review of the Colorado Supreme Court is clearly broad enough to
allow for comparative proportionality review.
41 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
42 See notes 6-14 supra and accompanying text.
[1984]
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disposition to be merciful, 43 provides a means to modify the decisions
of juries and judiciaries which result in discriminatory sentencing.
Clemency is more than the personal inclination of the executive to be
lenient in a particular case.4 As Justice Holmes stated:
[Clemency is] not a private act of grace from an individual hap-
pening to possess power. It is part of the constitutional scheme.
When granted, it is the determination of the ultimate authority
that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
what the judgment fixed.
45
Although there is a growing trend toward decentralization of
the clemency authority and greater delegation of this power to
boards, governors continue to have the final word in the vast major-
ity of states.46 Despite Justice Holmes' statement, however, gover-
nors can exercise their clemency power in a wholly discretionary
manner without following any stated standards.47 Moreover, the
governor's motives are not normally open to judicial review. 48 In-
deed, their reasons for commuting death sentences to life sentences
often indicate a discretionary character which would be constitution-
ally impermissible in a courtroom. These reasons include: the de-
fendant's physical or mental health; the effect of intoxication,
provocation or duress on the defendant's actions; the defendant's
guilt relative to the co-defendant's; the defendant's degree of rehabil-
itation; the viciousness of the crime; and the degree of public outrage
invoked by the crime.4
9
A governor's personal opposition to capital punishment may
also have a substantial effect on the commutation decision. Lee
Cruce, the governor of Oklahoma from 1911 to 1915, commuted
twenty-two death sentences to life imprisonment because he person-
ally opposed the death penalty.50 Former governors Edmund Brown
of California and Endicott Peabody of Massachusetts likewise com-
muted substantial numbers of death sentences. 5' Former governor of
New York Alfred E. Smith commuted all death sentences which the
43 S. STAFFORD, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE Xiii
(1977).
44 Id. at xiv.
45 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1926).
46 S. STAFFORD, supra note 43, at 1-5.
47 C. BLACK, supra note 19, at 81.
48 Eacret v. Holmes, 215 Or. 121, 333 P.2d 741 (1950).
49 R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 343 (1975).
50 Id. at 348.
51 Id.
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court of appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 52 Former governor of
Pennsylvania Milton Shapp publicly announced that no prisoners
would die while he was in office. 53 Although a state supreme court
might disagree with a governor who uses the clemency power in this
way,5 4 the court could never prevent a governor from carrying out
such a promise.
Governors can, through the use of their clemency power, thus
compensate for gaps they perceive in the law. By conducting a state-
wide comparative proportionality review, a governor could deter-
mine which defendants deserve more lenient treatment and also
instill a more regularized approach in the clemency procedure itself.
In a state where the judiciary does not conduct comparative propor-
tionality review, the clemency procedure represents the final oppor-
tunity to ensure evenhanded imposition of the death penalty.
Governors and boards already have staffs set up to review capital
cases. 55 These staffs seem particularly well-suited to compare a par-
ticular defendant's sentence to that of similarly situated defendants
throughout the state.
IV. Conclusion
Our society has determined through their state legislatures that
the most loathsome of criminals deserve the death penalty. Capital
punishment, however, must be imposed rationally and consistently,
or not at all. The best way to determine whether a state has met this
high standard is to examine statewide sentencing results before a
state carries out a death sentence. Although not mandated by the
Constitution, the majority of states and the Supreme Court have
found statewide comparative proportionality review effective in en-
52 Id. at 346.
53 Id. at 348.
54 For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reacted to Governor Cruce's policy as
follows:
No governor has the right to say, directly or substantially; . . "I think capital
punishment is wrong. I know what it is taught in the Bible, and is provided for in
the laws of Oklahoma, but I occupy a higher plane than this . . . . therefore,
notwithstanding my official oath, I will place my judgment above the law, both
human and divine, and will make my will supreme in the state, and will not permit
capital punishment to be inflicted in Oklahoma, no matter what the law is, or how
atrocious the offense committed may have been."
Id (quoting Henry v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 369, 389, 136 P. 982, 990 (1913)).
55 See generally S. STAFFORD, supra note 43. For a thorough discussion on methods used to
complement comparative proportionality review, see generally Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth
& Kyle, Identi_ ing Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L.
REv. (1980).
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suring rational, evenhanded, and consistent sentencing results. Eight
states, however, still do not conduct such a review at any stage of the
sentencing process. The legislatures, judiciaries, and governors of
these remaining states should recognize the wisdom of statewide
comparative proportionality review and adopt it as an element of
their capital sentencing procedure.
Robert Mark Camy
